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NOTES 
PARTY FOUL:  THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S 
IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEST IN EDUCATIONAL 
MEDIA CO. AT VIRGINIA TECH, INC. V. SWECKER 
Michelle Silva Fernandes*
 
 
The pervasive culture of underage and excessive drinking on college 
campuses has led to numerous federal and state regulatory efforts to reduce 
drinking rates among college students.  One such policy has been to restrict 
alcohol advertisements in college student publications, which implicates the 
First Amendment by limiting access to lawful commercial speech.  Although 
the Supreme Court has developed a four-part balancing test to determine 
the validity of commercial speech restrictions, the Court has not articulated 
the level of proof required for assessing the validity of restrictions on 
alcohol advertisements in college student publications. 
This Note focuses on the degree of constitutional protection that should 
be afforded to alcohol advertisements aimed at college students.  It begins 
by exploring the background and development of the commercial speech 
doctrine and focuses on the vice advertising subset.  Next, this Note 
discusses policies regarding alcohol use on college campuses and current 
initiatives to reduce both underage and excessive drinking.  This Note then 
presents the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits regarding the 
proper application of the commercial speech test when evaluating 
restrictions on alcohol advertising. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that alcohol advertisements in college 
student newspapers should be analyzed using the same standard as other 
commercial speech cases.  This Note proposes a resolution of the circuit 
split by articulating a clear application and evidentiary requirement for the 
commercial speech test regarding alcohol advertisements in college student 
publications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Beer is living proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy.”1
On October 9, 2010, police officers arrived at a Central Washington 
University (CWU) house party and found nine underage freshmen passed 
out and highly intoxicated, and dozens of others sick.
 
2  Given the disturbing 
scene, police initially suspected a drug overdose, and several students were 
hospitalized.3  After a full police investigation, however, officials 
announced that the students had fallen ill from binge drinking Four Loko, a 
popular caffeinated alcoholic beverage commonly referred to as “blackout 
in a can.”4
Available in eight fruity flavors, Four Loko was marketed heavily to 
college students from its inception in 2006 through the CWU incident.
 
5
 
 1. See George F. Will, Survival of the Sudsiest, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at A15 
(attributing the quote to Benjamin Franklin). 
  
 2. See Shannon Dininny, Four Loko Sickened Several Central Washington University 
Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/10/25/four-loko-sickened-centra_n_773597.html. 
 3. See Student Released from Hospital After Spiked-Drinks Incident, CNN (Oct. 11, 
2010, 5:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/10/10/washington.students.overdose; 
see also Dininny, supra note 2 (discussing how, despite early police suspicions, Four Loko 
was to blame for the CWU incident). 
 4. Alan Duke, ‘Blackout in a Can’ Blamed For Student Party Illnesses, CNN (Oct. 26, 
2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/25/washington.students.overdose/
index.html (identifying Four Loko as the cause of the CWU incident). 
 5. See Abe Sauer, Four Loko Declines to Own Its Marketing Strategy, BRANDCHANNEL 
(Oct. 28, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/10/28/Four-
Loko-Declines-To-Own-Its-Excellent-Marketing-Strategy.aspx (examining the Four Loko 
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The drink came in colorful packaging, and the company’s advertising 
focused on the college student market.6  Students even created, with Four 
Loko’s support, their own videos that they posted online.7  Four Loko was 
also inexpensive, and while popular among students, it did not attract 
regulatory attention until 2010,8 when it was blamed for several drinking-
related deaths and accidents, and was subsequently banned in several states 
and universities.9
The viral Four Loko marketing campaign is an example of alcohol 
advertising, a form of commercial speech.
 
10  Although alcohol consumption 
is lawful, it is classified as a “vice,” a socially harmful activity, like 
gambling or tobacco use.11  These activities are typically subject to stricter 
regulation.12  Along with alcohol’s vice status, the culture of binge drinking 
on college campuses has contributed to particularly strict regulation of the 
alcohol industry and its advertising component.13
Commercial speech doctrine developed from a desire to protect 
consumers’ interest in accurate commercial information.
 
14  The law did not 
recognize commercial speech as protected until 1976.15
 
viral marketing strategy using social media websites to gain popularity among college 
students). 
  Nevertheless, 
 6. See, e.g., Abe Sauer, Four Loko in Danger of Becoming for Loco ‘Blackout’ Brand, 
BRANDCHANNEL (Oct. 27, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/2010/
10/27/Four-Loko-Delivers-On-Blackout-Brand-Promise.aspx (highlighting the YouTube 
videos and social media pages dedicated to Four Loko); Willy Staley, Four Loko Delivered 
Just What Its Marketing Department Promised, AWL (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.theawl.com/2010/10/four-loko-delivered-just-what-its-marketing-department-
promised (reviewing the various online rap videos dedicated to Four Loko). 
 7. See Staley, supra note 6. 
 8. See generally Meredith Melnick, ‘Blackout in a Can’:  Alcoholic Energy Drinks 
Keep Wreaking Havoc, TIME (Oct. 26, 2010), http://healthland.time.com/2010/10/26/
blackout-in-a-can-alcoholic-energy-drinks-keep-wreaking-havoc/ (discussing Four Loko’s 
rising popularity and negative effects); Steve Wood, Four Loko Energy Drink Raises Health 
Concerns Among Youth, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
yourlife/parenting-family/teen-ya/2010-11-10-alcoholic-energy-drinks_N.htm (noting Four 
Loko’s cheap price and high alcohol content, as well as the FDA’s focus on the drink). 
 9. See generally Jenna Johnson & Kevin Sieff, Four Loko Ban Fuels Buying Binge, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2010, 8:24 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/18/AR2010111806114.html (discussing state and university bans of Four 
Loko). 
 10. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing commercial speech). 
 11. See generally P. Cameron Devore, First Amendment Protection of “Vice” 
Advertising:  Current Commercial Speech Hot Buttons, 15 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (1997) 
(discussing how the First Amendment has been applied to vice advertising). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK, PAYING THE TAB:  THE ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL POLICY 
151–52 (2007) (noting that state governments regulate alcohol through the Twenty-first 
Amendment, with each state free to adopt its own alcohol taxes and regulations). 
 14. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-history and Pre-history of Commercial 
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 754–59 (1993) (giving an overview of commercial speech 
doctrine development); see also M. Neil Browne et al., Advertising to Children and the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine:  Political and Constitutional Limitations, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 
67, 77–86 (2009) (describing the federal agencies in place to regulate advertising). 
 15. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 627, 629–31 (1990) (discussing the evolution of commercial speech starting in 
1976). 
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commercial speech is referred to as “the stepchild of the First Amendment” 
because it is provided less protection than noncommercial speech.16
Within commercial speech jurisprudence, courts have carved out a vice 
advertising subset, which includes alcohol advertising.
 
17  Vice advertising 
refers to advertisements for certain products or activities that the public 
considers undesirable, such as tobacco and gambling advertisements, and 
has been the focus of many regulatory efforts.18  However, such regulatory 
efforts are limited by constitutional considerations:  after all, it is lawful for 
adults over the age of twenty-one to consume alcohol.19
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a four-part balancing test to 
determine the validity of restrictions that limit commercial speech.
 
20  
However, the Court has not articulated what type of proof is required when 
assessing the validity of restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college 
student publications.  Currently, the Third and Fourth Circuits are split 
regarding what evidentiary showing a party must make in determining 
whether to uphold governmental restrictions on alcohol advertising in 
college student publications.21  The Third Circuit analyzed this issue in Pitt 
News v. Pappert,22 holding that a prohibition on alcohol advertisements in 
college student publications unconstitutionally restricted free speech, due to 
the government’s lack of evidence proving that the restriction directly 
advanced the state’s interest and was narrowly drawn.23  The recent Fourth 
Circuit decision in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. 
Swecker24 reached a conflicting conclusion, upholding a similar state law 
despite a lack of evidence that the restriction directly advanced the state’s 
interest and was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.25
This Note discusses the background and development of the commercial 
speech doctrine, with a focus on the vice advertising subset.  Part I explores 
the development and current position of the commercial speech doctrine 
and discusses the evolution of vice advertising jurisprudence.  It analyzes 
current policies designed to reduce underage and binge drinking.  In Part II, 
this Note presents the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits regarding 
the proper application of the commercial speech test when evaluating 
  This Note 
proposes a resolution to the split, advocating that the Supreme Court adopt 
the Third Circuit’s reasoning and evidentiary requirements. 
 
 16. Comment, Developments in the Law—Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1005, 1027–29 (1967) (discussing the constitutional status of commercial speech).  
 17. See Clay Calvert, Wendy Allen-Brunner & Christina M. Locke, Playing Politics or 
Protecting Children?  Congressional Action & a First Amendment Analysis of the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201, 213–14 (2010) (discussing 
the vice advertising subset of commercial speech). 
 18. See id. at 214. 
 19. See, e.g., Browne et al., supra note 14, at 104–10 (discussing how vice 
advertisements can be limited). 
 20. See infra Part I.C. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 23. Id. at 113; see also infra Part II.A. 
 24. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010). 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
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restrictions on alcohol advertising.  Additionally, Part II discusses how 
other circuit courts apply the commercial speech test in vice advertising 
cases.  Part III of this Note proposes a resolution of the circuit split, arguing 
that alcohol advertisements in college student newspapers should be 
analyzed under the same standard as other commercial speech cases.  
Specifically, Part III posits that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split 
by clearly articulating the proper application and evidentiary standard of 
the commercial speech test. 
I.  A LONG TIME IN THE BARREL:  THE LONG ROAD TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR ALCOHOL ADVERTISING 
A.  A Brief First Amendment Overview 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.”26  The freedom of expression is a 
vital, fundamental right.27  While the drafters did not indicate what speech 
they intended the First Amendment to protect, historians suggest that the 
Amendment was a reaction to existing speech and press restrictions on 
political expression.28  The First Amendment has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to protect against congressional, presidential, judicial, and 
state attempts to abridge speech.29
1.  First Amendment Background 
  This section provides background 
information about the First Amendment and what it protects, including 
commercial speech. 
The text of the First Amendment created many ambiguities regarding 
what falls within its scope of protection.30
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
  While the text of the First 
Amendment contains absolute language, the Supreme Court has never 
expressed the view that the First Amendment prohibits all governmental 
 27. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 14–17 (1992) (theorizing 
that multiple justifications underlie freedom of speech); see also Steven Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation:  Away from a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1214–18 (1983) (stating that the multiple theories 
underlying the First Amendment are all plausible). 
 28. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 1–10 (1941) 
(discussing the drafters’ intent behind the First Amendment). 
 29. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1–2, 13–16 (2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the scope of First Amendment protection); Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 58–59 (2000) (noting that states have to observe the 
First Amendment). 
 30. See CHAFFEE, supra note 28, at 16 (noting that the drafters did not define the 
meaning of the First Amendment). 
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restrictions on expression.31  Rather, the Supreme Court has held that 
certain restrictions on expression may be permitted for legitimate reasons.32
The Court has established that different categories of speech are entitled 
to varying degrees of protection.
 
33  Although there is no textual distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial speech in the Amendment,34 the 
Framers were more concerned with protecting political speech, given its 
importance to the democratic process.35
2.  The First Amendment’s Stepchild:  Commercial Speech 
  
Although the First Amendment does not distinguish between 
noncommercial and commercial speech in its text, the Supreme Court has 
recognized such a distinction.36  The commercial speech doctrine has 
continuously evolved since its emergence in 1976, due to the Court’s 
changing philosophy about how best to evaluate commercial speech.37
Courts have been reluctant to extend full First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech, partially due to two prevailing ideas regarding 
commercial speech.
 
38  First, advertising should not be trusted given its 
tendency to exaggerate.  This was the impetus behind the creation of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which enforces advertising laws in an 
effort to protect American consumers.39
 
 31. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (3d ed. 2008); 
see also Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874–79 (1960) (urging the 
Court to take the First Amendment’s text literally). 
  Second, commercial speech merits 
 32. See Louis J. Virelli, Permissible Burden or Constitutional Violation?  A First 
Amendment Analysis of Congress’ Proposed Removal of Tax Deductibility from Tobacco 
Advertisements, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 534 & n.31 (2000) (noting that libel, slander, 
obscenity, and incitement are not afforded First Amendment protection). 
 33. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century:  Ten Lessons from 
the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 273–74 (2009) (stating that despite a few 
scattered free speech cases, the courts did not seriously interpret the First Amendment until 
1919); see also David Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207–09 (1983). 
 34. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. GARTNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8 (1989) 
(stating that the Framers understood that it did not matter if information was conveyed 
through advertisements or as noncommercial speech). 
 35. See EDWIN ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE 
SPEECH 36 (1985) (noting that free speech is integral in a democratic system). 
 36. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 757–58. But see GARTNER, supra note 34, 
at 8–11 (arguing that this distinction was contrived by the Court). 
 37. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 779 (1999) (noting that 
commercial speech has no presumption of validity); see also Benjamin B. Nelson, 
Regulation or Prohibition?  The Troubled Legal Status of Internet Gambling Casinos in the 
United States in the Wake of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 9 
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 39, 53–56 (2007) (discussing the Court’s shifting commercial 
speech framework); Brian J. Waters, Note, A Doctrine in Disarray:  Why the First 
Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1627–30 (1997) (advocating that commercial speech be 
afforded full constitutional protection). 
 38. See THOMAS L. TEDFORD & DALE HARBECK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 192–93 (5th ed. 2005) (noting the reasons behind the anti-advertising attitudes). 
 39. See id. at 192 (discussing the FTC). 
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less constitutional protection than political speech because it has “less 
social value,” and is not essential to the democratic process.40  Given these 
factors, courts treated commercial speech as an element of business and 
property law, and not as expression, from the establishment of the FTC in 
1914 through the emergence of the commercial speech doctrine in 1976.41
Proponents of commercial speech protection argue that the First 
Amendment is not limited to protecting political speech.
 
42  Commercial 
speech supporters also assert that because advertising serves an important 
information purpose, restrictions on advertising should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.43
B.  The Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech that (1) 
constitutes a type of advertisement; (2) refers to a specific product; and (3) 
represents an economic motivation by the speech’s owner.44  Initially, the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect commercial 
speech.45  Increased awareness about the social value of certain types of 
advertisements, however, persuaded the Court to reverse course and begin 
recognizing advertising as speech.46
1.  The Commercial Speech “Exception” 
  This section discusses the 
development of the general commercial speech doctrine. 
In 1942, the Supreme Court enunciated the commercial speech exception 
to free speech law in Valentine v. Chrestensen.47  In Chrestensen, the Court 
adopted a bright-line rule excluding commercial speech from First 
Amendment protection.48
In Chrestensen, the Court considered whether a New York City 
sanitation ordinance prohibiting the distribution of “commercial and 
 
 
 40. Id. See generally Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 
81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606 (1996) (arguing that the characteristics of commercial speech do 
not necessitate that it be afforded the same protection as noncommercial speech). 
 41. See TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 192–93. 
 42. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 15, at 652 (noting that in a “free market 
economy,” commercial speech may be as important as noncommercial speech). But see 
Sylvia Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 932 (1992) 
(arguing that commercial speech should not be fully protected). 
 43. See generally R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS:  FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL 
CULTURE 16 (1997). 
 44. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (concluding 
that a federal statute prohibiting all unsolicited contraceptive mailings was an 
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech under the First Amendment). 
 45. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes 
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”). 
 46. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
378–79 (1973) (noting that commercial speech has some informational value). 
 47. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
 48. See id. at 54–55; see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, at 756–59 (discussing 
Chrestensen). 
2011] PARTY FOUL IN EDUCATIONAL MEDIA CO. 1333 
business advertising matter”49 was unconstitutional as applied to F.J. 
Chrestensen, who printed handbills that advertised tours on his 
submarine.50  After being informed that the handbill was prohibited under 
the ordinance, Chrestensen revised the handbill to contain a mix of 
commercial information and political protest language.51
After being told that the new handbill was still in violation of the 
ordinance, Chrestensen filed suit, asserting a violation of his constitutional 
right to free speech.
 
52  The Supreme Court held that the application of the 
ordinance to Chrestensen was not unconstitutional, as the intent behind the 
handbill was commercial, and commercial speech was not protected by the 
Constitution.53  Under Chrestensen, if the primary purpose behind speech 
was deemed commercial, that speech would not receive First Amendment 
protection.54
2.  Commercial Speech Protection Begins 
 
In the thirty years following Chrestensen, the Court repeatedly applied its 
primary purpose test to evaluate whether speech was commercial or 
noncommercial.55  In 1973, the Court shifted its jurisprudence regarding 
commercial speech in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations.56  Pittsburgh Press involved a city ordinance that 
prohibited newspapers from publishing classified advertisements that 
discriminated on the basis of sex.57  Although the Court ultimately upheld 
the ordinance because gender discrimination was illegal, it indicated that 
the advertisements would have been entitled to some protection if the 
advertised activity was not illegal.58
The Supreme Court went further to protect commercial speech in 
Bigelow v. Virginia.
 
59
 
 49. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53. 
  In Bigelow, the Court evaluated whether a Virginia 
statute prohibiting publications from printing abortion service 
 50. See id. at 52–54. 
 51. See id. at 53 (noting “that handbills solely devoted to ‘information or a public 
protest’” were allowed). 
 52. See id. at 54. 
 53. Id. at 55. 
 54. See BRADFORD W. SCHARLOTT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF 
ADVERTISING IN THE MASS MEDIA (1980), reprinted in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 1, 3 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., 4th ed. 2004); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 14, 
at 755–58 (discussing the legacy of Chrestensen). 
 55. See ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 35, at 4 (stating that “purely commercial 
advertising or commercial speech [was] completely unprotected by the First Amendment” 
for more than thirty years). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) 
(holding that paid political advertisements were protected and categorized as political, not 
commercial speech). 
 56. 413 U.S. 376 (1973); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 89–91. 
 57. See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 378. 
 58. See id. at 388–89; see, e.g., TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 200. 
 59. 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 91–92 (noting how 
Bigelow clarified commercial speech protection for certain activities). 
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advertisements was constitutional.60  Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for 
the majority, limited the Chrestensen holding by stating that Chrestensen 
only determined that regulations regarding the distribution of commercial 
matter were reasonable, not “that all statutes regulating commercial 
advertising are immune from constitutional challenge.”61  Justice Blackmun 
went on to state that “speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection 
merely because it appears [commercially].”62
The Court was more explicit about commercial speech protection in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,
 
63 expressly holding that the First Amendment protects truthful speech 
that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”64  The majority 
stated that advertisements “may be of general public interest”65 despite their 
commercial nature and noted that in a “predominantly free enterprise 
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made 
through numerous private economic decisions.”66
The Virginia Pharmacy Court stopped short of affording commercial 
speech equal constitutional protection as noncommercial speech, stating 
that commercial speech was still protected to a lesser extent.
 
67  The Court 
indicated that the difference in protection was warranted by 
“commonsense” distinctions between advertising and other speech.68
In the year following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court overturned 
governmental restrictions on advertising for contraception, legal services, 
and real estate sales.
 
69  While reiterating that it did not intend to equalize 
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech, the 
Court did not specify the disparity of protection between noncommercial 
and commercial speech.70
 
 60. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 811–15 (noting that a Virginia editor had printed a New 
York abortion clinic advertisement; abortions were legal in New York at the time). 
 
 61. Id. at 819–20 (stating that Chrestensen should not be understood as disallowing First 
Amendment protection for advertising). 
 62. Id. at 818. 
 63. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 64. Id. at 762. 
 65. See id. at 764 (“[S]ociety also may have a strong interest in the free flow of 
commercial information.”); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial 
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2000) (arguing that commercial speech is constitutionally 
protected because of the informational function that advertising serves). 
 66. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
 67. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 177 (3d 
ed. 2007) (noting that cases subsequent to Virginia Pharmacy established an intermediate 
level of scrutiny for commercial speech). 
 68. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771–72 n.24 (noting that there are “commonsense 
differences” between commercial and noncommercial speech). 
 69. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down an 
Arizona law prohibiting legal service advertisements); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning government ban on contraceptive advertising); Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating a law prohibiting 
the posting of “for sale” signs on real estate property). 
 70. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456–57 (1978) (noting that the 
validity of a ban on legal solicitations was subject to a lower level of scrutiny because it was 
commercial speech). 
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C.  The Standard for General Commercial Speech:  Central Hudson 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 
of New York,71 the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test for 
determining when the government may regulate commercial speech.72
1.  The Central Hudson Balancing Test 
for Evaluating Commercial Speech Restrictions 
  This 
section discusses the Supreme Court’s decision, and explores how the 
Central Hudson commercial speech test has evolved. 
Central Hudson involved a New York State Public Service Commission 
regulation banning electric utility companies from “promot[ing] the use of 
electricity.”73  The state argued that it could implement the ban because of 
its interest in limiting electric utility use.74  The electric company 
challenged the regulation by alleging that the ban violated the company’s 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.75
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional protection of 
commercial speech.
 
76  States seeking to uphold restrictions on commercial 
speech, the Court held, must show that they have a “substantial interest” in 
regulating the speech, in addition to proving that the restriction was 
carefully drafted to serve that interest.77
 In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.  
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by 
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If 
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
  The Court then set forth the four-
part standard for evaluating commercial speech: 
78
 In applying this standard, the Court found that the first two prongs were 
satisfied, thereby establishing a relatively low threshold for meeting those 
 
 
 71. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 72. Id. at 566 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 (1978)) (differentiating between 
commercial speech that is regulated by the government and noncommercial speech). 
 73. See id. at 558–60 (noting that the challenged ban prohibited promotional advertising 
for electrical services and was aimed at encouraging shifts of electric consumption away 
from peak times and to off-peak periods). 
 74. See id. at 559 (discussing how New York had legitimate fuel shortage concerns, 
which necessitated the need for energy conservation). 
 75. See id. at 560–61 (internal citations omitted) (remarking how the New York State 
Court of Appeals upheld the commission’s order because they found little social value in 
promotional electric utility advertising). 
 76. See id. at 564 (stating that government restrictions on lawful commercial speech 
must be evaluated under the First Amendment to be upheld); see also Nelson, supra note 37, 
at 51–52 (discussing the importance of Central Hudson). 
 77. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 78. Id. at 566. 
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prongs.79  The Court found the promotional advertising in question was not 
misleading or related to unlawful activity, and thus entitled to some 
constitutional protection.80  The state asserted interests in energy 
conservation and a fair and efficient rate structure.81  The Court agreed that 
both interests were “substantial.”82
The third prong asks whether the restriction directly and materially 
advances the government’s interest.
 
83  The Court found that the state’s 
interest in energy conservation satisfied this prong, agreeing with the state’s 
argument that an advertising ban on utility services would lead to less 
demand for those services.84  Nevertheless, the Court did not find that the 
state’s interest in a fair and efficient rate structure satisfied the third 
prong.85  The Court held that the connection between the ban and the state’s 
interest in a fair and efficient rate structure was indirect at best.86
Applying the fourth prong, the Court placed the burden on the state to 
prove that the prohibition was not “more extensive than necessary to further 
the State’s interest in energy conservation.”
 
87  The Court ultimately found 
that the state did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to 
demonstrate that there was no less restrictive means to accomplish its 
interest in energy conservation.88  The Court struck down the 
Commission’s order as an unconstitutional infringement on commercial 
speech.89
Although Central Hudson established a standard for evaluating 
governmental restrictions on commercial speech, the Supreme Court did not 
define commercial speech until Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp.
 
90  
Bolger involved a constitutional challenge of a federal statute banning 
mailings of contraceptive advertisements.91
 
 79. See id. at 566–69; see also Browne et al., supra note 
  The advertisements at issue 
14, at 105–07 (noting that the 
low threshold for the government to meet the first two prongs has persisted). 
 80. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–68. 
 81. See id. at 568–69. 
 82. Id. at 569. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. (finding that the direct link between the restriction on advertising and demand for 
electricity was “immediate”).  This reflects a generally accepted view of Supreme Court 
commercial speech jurisprudence:  advertising increases demand, so a ban on that 
advertising should lessen demand. See infra Part I.D. 
 85. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569. 
 86. See id. at 569 (“[T]he link between the advertising prohibition and appellant’s rate 
structure is, at most, tenuous.”). 
 87. See id. at 569–70 (“[The state] has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation 
cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant’s commercial 
expression.”). 
 88. See id. at 570. 
 89. See id. at 570–72 (implying that the state carried the burden to show that anything 
less than the total ban on promotional advertising would be ineffective at furthering the 
state’s interest in conservation). 
 90. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 91. See id. at 61–62. 
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contained a mix of commercial and noncommercial information.92  Youngs 
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the 
statute violated its First Amendment rights.93  The district court held that 
the advertisements were protected speech despite the mix of commercial 
and noncommercial information, and found that the statute’s absolute ban 
violated the First Amendment.94  The Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court, holding the statute unconstitutional.95  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court expanded its definition of what constitutes commercial 
speech to include speech (1) that is a type of advertisement; (2) that refers 
to a specific product or service; and (3) where the speech’s owner has an 
economic motivation behind the speech.96
Since Central Hudson, courts have applied the four-part test to evaluate 
the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech.
 
97  While 
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test involve a relatively 
straightforward analysis and have been consistently applied by lower 
courts, the third and fourth prongs have created a great deal of confusion.98
2.  The Supreme Court Shifts Its Stance on Commercial Speech 
  
Much of this confusion stems from the fact that the Court in Central 
Hudson did not provide any guidance regarding the burden of proof for 
each prong or what would constitute sufficient proof to prevail. 
The Court’s application of the third and fourth prongs has shifted in the 
years since Central Hudson, leaving an ambiguous standard in place.99
 
 92. See id. at 66–67 (noting that although the mailings contained contraceptive product 
advertisements and material regarding the importance of contraception generally, the speech 
was commercial). 
  In 
the decade following Central Hudson, the Supreme Court was reluctant to 
broaden the constitutional protection it had afforded commercial speech by 
requiring a low evidentiary showing for the government to meet its burden 
 93. See id. at 63. 
 94. See id. at 63–64. 
 95. See id. at 75. 
 96. See id. at 66–67 (determining that the mailings were commercial speech); see also 
Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55 
(1999). 
 97. See, e.g., Shannon M. Hinegardner, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto 
Rational Basis Standard for Commercial Speech:  A Survey and Proposed Revision of the 
Third Central Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 528 (2009) (proposing that a 
“material evidence” standard should be used in applying Central Hudson’s third prong); 
Nelson, supra note 37, at 52–55 (discussing how Central Hudson has been applied to 
commercial speech cases). 
 98. See Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on 
FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 170–75 (2008) (highlighting how the government can 
typically fulfill the first two prongs, but litigation centers on the third and fourth); see also 
Browne et al., supra note 14, at 107 (noting the “ease” with which the government can fulfill 
the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test). 
 99. See Carver, supra note 98, at 174–76 (discussing how the Court has shifted the 
government’s burden requirement under the third and fourth prongs since Central Hudson). 
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under the third and fourth prongs.100  In 1993, however, the Court started to 
express a willingness to expand constitutional protection of commercial 
speech, indicated in part by the Court requiring a higher evidentiary 
standard for the government to meet its burden under the third and fourth 
prongs.101
a.  The Evolution of the Central Hudson Prongs 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that the third prong of Central Hudson 
requires a speech restriction to “directly and materially advance[] the 
asserted governmental interest.”102  The Court has described this 
requirement as “critical.”103  The fourth prong requires that the regulation 
not be “more extensive than [] necessary,” requiring the government to 
demonstrate a narrow and reasonable fit between the challenged restriction 
and the stated interest.104
In Central Hudson, the Court did not outline the burden or evidence 
required in order to satisfy the third and fourth prongs.  In Metromedia, Inc. 
v. San Diego,
  Given the relationship between the two prongs, 
the Court often assesses both together. 
105 however, the Court appeared to adopt a standard of 
legislative deference.106  In this 1981 case, the Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a San Diego ordinance restricting outdoor billboards 
within the city.107
 
 100. See Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew:  The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence 
Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 748 
(1997) (noting the change in the amount of protection that the Court is willing to extend 
commercial speech). 
 
 101. See Daniel E. Troy, Advertising:  Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 
140 (1999) (noting that the Justices have been applying stricter, but not strict, scrutiny to the 
third and fourth prongs in recent commercial speech cases); see also Michael Hoefges & 
Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme Court’s Commercial 
Speech Doctrine:  The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
345, 372 (2000) (discussing how the Court has increased the government’s burden to satisfy 
the third and fourth Central Hudson prongs). 
 102. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999); 
see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 107 (discussing the direct advancement inquiry of 
the third prong). 
 103. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188. 
 104. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (stating that the 
government has the burden to show that it “‘carefully calculated’ the costs and benefits 
associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the 
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))); see also Browne et al., supra note 
14, at 108 (discussing the requirements of the fourth prong). 
 105. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 106. See Mark A. Conrad, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. 
Fox—The Dawn of a New Age of Commercial Speech Regulation of Tobacco and Alcohol, 9 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 61, 75 (1990) (noting how the Court was deferential to the state 
in Metromedia). But see Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First 
Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 599 (2004) (arguing that the Court in Metromedia 
treated the billboards as regulating the manner of speech and not the speech itself, similar to 
the Court’s reasoning in Chrestensen). 
 107. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493–94 (stating that the ordinance allowed for on-site 
commercial advertising, but forbade most other outdoor advertising signs unless they fell 
within one of twelve exceptions). 
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Applying Central Hudson to the restrictions on commercial speech, the 
Court first found that the first two prongs of the test were easily met.108  In 
applying the third prong, the Court deferred to the local legislature’s 
“common-sense” judgment, stating that the legislature was in the best 
position to determine the most appropriate way to achieve its interest in 
aesthetics and traffic safety.109  The Court showed similar deference in its 
application of the fourth prong, agreeing with the state’s argument that the 
billboard ordinance was the most direct approach to addressing the traffic 
hazard and aesthetic concerns of the municipality.110  This decision was 
relatively weak commercial speech protection because it appeared to 
propose that the third and fourth prongs did not require any evidence and 
that deference would be given to the state.111
Following Metromedia, the Supreme Court showed less deference to 
state legislatures in evaluating the validity of commercial speech 
restrictions, but was still reluctant to expand constitutional protection for 
commercial speech.
 
112  In 1989, the Supreme Court focused on the fourth 
prong in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,113 
stating that commercial speech restrictions must have a reasonable fit 
between the legislature’s means and ends, “not necessarily the least 
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.” 114  Nevertheless, the Court stated that if a restriction meets this 
burden, then it would defer to legislative judgment.115
This standard was adopted by lower courts as a deferential stance slightly 
short of the least restrictive means standard, only marginally tougher for 
states to meet than the deferential standard established in Metromedia.
 
116  
Fox illustrated the Supreme Court’s continued reluctance to expand 
constitutional protection for commercial speech because the Court did not 
require the state to show that a challenged regulation was the least 
restrictive alternative.117
 
 108. Id. at 507–08 (finding that the commercial speech was lawful and agreeing that the 
state had a substantial interest). 
 
 109. Id. (reflecting the Court’s reluctance to expand commercial speech protection further 
than what Central Hudson provided). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 74–75 (highlighting how the Court in Metromedia 
quickly found Central Hudson’s test satisfied, but was much more speech-protective while 
analyzing the billboard’s effect on noncommercial speech). 
 112. See TEDFORD & HARBECK, supra note 38, at 208. 
 113. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 114. Id. at 480. 
 115. Id. (noting that the Court would defer to the government’s judgment if the restriction 
was narrowly tailored). 
 116. See Hinegardner, supra note 97, at 529–30. 
 117. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 82–85 (discussing how lower courts interpreted Fox 
as shifting the burden from the government to the party challenging the restriction, but how 
this was subsequently overturned in Edenfield). 
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b.  The Court Expands Constitutional Protection for Commercial Speech 
In 1993, the Court began to change its stance regarding the constitutional 
protection afforded to commercial speech in Edenfield v. Fane.118  In 
Edenfield, the Court focused its evaluation of a commercial speech 
restriction on the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.119  Edenfield 
concerned the constitutionality of a Florida Board of Accountancy rule 
prohibiting licensed certified public accountants from obtaining new clients 
through “direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation.”120
Departing from its deferential position in earlier post-Central Hudson 
cases, the Court in Edenfield shifted positions and ruled that the 
government has the burden to provide sound evidence to support its 
position.
 
121  The Court held that this restriction was unconstitutional 
because the government did not meet its third prong evidentiary burden; 
specifically, the government did not provide any anecdotal evidence to 
support its contention that there would be harmful consequences without 
the ban.122
Two years later in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
 
123 lawyers challenged 
Florida Bar Association rules imposing a thirty-day waiting period 
following accidents and disasters before personal injury lawyers could 
solicit victims and families, claiming the rules were a violation of their 
commercial speech rights.124  The district court and the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the rules violated the First Amendment.125  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower courts’ holdings that the first two prongs of Central 
Hudson were met, but disagreed about the third and fourth prongs.126
Finding that the third prong was met, the Court concluded that the 
restriction directly and materially advanced the state’s interest in its 
residents’ well-being.
 
127
 
 118. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
  The Florida Bar had submitted statistical evidence 
highlighting the harmful effect of immediate solicitation on victims, which 
 119. See id. at 770 (finding that the first two prongs were satisfied because the state has a 
substantial interest in regulating CPA solicitations to ensure independence). 
 120. See id. at 764–66 (internal citations omitted) (noting that the CPA challenging the 
restriction in Florida had previously practiced accountancy in New Jersey, where direct, in-
person, uninvited solicitation was permitted). 
 121. See id. at 770–71 (“[This] burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; 
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them 
to a material degree.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Hinegardner, supra note 97, at 
536–37 (noting that Edenfield tightened the burden required for the third prong). 
 122. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771–73 (discussing how Florida’s only supporting 
evidence was testimony from the Florida Board of Accountancy’s chairman, whose 
testimony was a series of conclusory statements without supporting evidence that did not add 
to the Board’s justifications for the ban). 
 123. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 124. See id. at 620 (holding that Florida Bar rules prohibiting targeted solicitations by 
personal injury lawyers for thirty days following an accident or disaster do not violate the 
Constitution). 
 125. See id. at 621–22. 
 126. See id. at 632–35. 
 127. See id. at 632–34. 
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the Court noted was important to finding that the state had fulfilled its 
burden.128  Finally, the Court found that the fourth prong was met, agreeing 
with the state’s argument that there were no reasonable alternatives to the 
statute, and that the thirty-day restriction was a reasonable and well-tailored 
fit given the state’s interest.129  Thus, the Court concluded that the Florida 
Bar rules were a permissible restriction on commercial speech, and upheld 
them.130
In both of these cases, the inclusion of statistical evidence was critical 
because the Court displayed a willingness to independently assess the 
evidentiary support for the restrictions rather than defer to state 
legislatures.
 
131
D.  The Commercial Speech Standard for Vice Advertising 
  This had the effect of enhancing the protection for 
commercial speech. 
The Supreme Court and legislatures have considered alcohol, gambling, 
and tobacco advertising to be vice advertisements because they promote 
socially harmful activities.132  Despite the eagerness to regulate vice 
advertising, the Court’s stance affording greater constitutional protection to 
commercial speech generally has also been reflected in vice advertising 
cases.133
1.  Gambling and the Rational Relationship Standard 
  This section focuses on the commercial speech doctrine as 
applied to vice advertising. 
Modern vice advertising doctrine began in 1986 with Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,134 a case concerning 
governmental restrictions on gambling advertising.135  The Supreme Court 
adopted a paternalistic and deferential approach to local legislative 
judgment in Posadas,136
 
 128. See id. at 627 (“[The] anecdotal record [about the harms caused by immediate 
solicitation] mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and detail.”). 
 reflecting its position along the arc of commercial 
 129. See id. at 632–34. 
 130. See id. at 634–35. 
 131. See generally Virelli, supra note 37, at 547–48 (discussing that while the Court 
upheld the regulation in Florida Bar, it indicated that evidence was crucial for the state to 
meet its evidentiary burden). 
 132. See, e.g., P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH:  A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE 4–22 (1999); Hoefges & Rivera-Sanchez, supra note 
101, at 361–62. 
 133. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) 
(indicating that the Court might be willing to craft a vice advertising exception to the 
commercial speech doctrine), with 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996) 
(noting that vice status does alone “provide a principled justification for the regulation of 
commercial speech about that activity”). 
 134. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Nelson, supra note 37, at 52 (characterizing Posadas as paternalistic); see also 
Daniel Helberg, Butt Out:  An Analysis of the FDA’s Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette 
Advertising Under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1219, 1252–54 
(1996) (noting that Posadas suggested judicial deference would be applied where a vice 
activity is being regulated). 
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speech doctrine between Metromedia137 and Fox.138  The Posadas Court 
was reluctant to expand constitutional protection for commercial speech and 
applied Central Hudson to find that the restrictions were constitutional.139
Finding that the first two prongs were easily met, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Posadas turned on its application of the third and fourth 
prongs.
 
140  Like its decision in Central Hudson, the Court found that the 
third prong was satisfied by the legislature’s reasonable belief that 
restricting casino gambling advertising would reduce demand; the Court 
stated that this belief was “reasonable” as evidenced by the casino’s desire 
to appeal the restriction all the way to the Supreme Court. 141  Finally, the 
Court decided that the fourth prong was met, reasoning that because the 
Puerto Rico Legislature could ban casino gambling outright, it could ban 
and regulate casino gambling in whatever manner it saw fit.142
The Court followed Posadas with United States v. Edge Broadcasting 
Co.,
 
143 where it upheld regulations prohibiting radio stations from 
broadcasting lottery advertisements in states that did not operate 
lotteries.144  As in Posadas, the Supreme Court in Edge Broadcasting took 
a paternalistic approach and upheld the federal law.145
However, the Court revisited the gambling issue in Greater New Orleans 
Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States.
 
146  In Greater New Orleans, the 
Court evaluated the constitutionality of section 316 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, which prohibited the broadcasting of lottery and casino 
gambling on the radio and television.147
 
 137. See supra notes 
  Even though gambling was legal 
in Louisiana, the law prohibited broadcasters and television and radio 
105–11 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Conrad, supra note 106, at 79–82 (noting that Posadas was significant because it 
resulted in the Court giving more deference to the state when crafting commercial speech 
restrictions). 
 139. See id. (discussing the Court’s reluctance to extend commercial speech protection 
because of the vice nature of gambling advertising); see also Browne et al., supra note 14, at 
100 (noting that the effect of Posadas was to “weaken the commercial speech doctrine by 
affording deference to the states”); Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the 
Internet:  Spam and the First Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 266–67 
(1998) (same). 
 140. See Browne et al., supra note 14, at 99–100 (discussing how Posadas turned on the 
third and fourth prongs). 
 141. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) 
(reasoning that the appellant’s choice “to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates 
that appellant shares the legislature’s view”). 
 142. See id. at 346 (“[P]recisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale 
prohibition . . . it is permissible for the government to [reduce] demand through restrictions 
on advertising.”); see also Nelson, supra note 37, at 52. 
 143. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 144. See Laura J. Schiller, The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.:  Vice 
or Victim of the Commercial Speech Doctrine?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 127, 130–
31 (1995). 
 145. See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 426 (agreeing that the government’s interest in 
discouraging gambling is substantial); see also Schiller, supra note 144, at 145–50 
(examining the reasoning in Edge Broadcasting). 
 146. 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (holding that the statute banning lottery and gambling 
advertisements was unconstitutional). 
 147. See id. at 177–78. 
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station operators from broadcasting lottery and casino gambling 
advertisements.148  The broadcasters sued, claiming that the regulation, as 
applied to them, violated the First Amendment.149
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court found that the first two 
prongs were satisfied.
 
150  However, the Court did not find that the third and 
fourth prongs were met.151  The Court determined that the government’s 
regulatory scheme regarding tribal versus private casino regulations was 
inconsistent, given its stated interests in reducing gambling and preventing 
gambling in states that restrict gambling.152
Although Greater New Orleans did not directly overrule Posadas or 
Edge Broadcasting, the Court seemed to require more rigorous proof of a 
connection between the means and ends of governmental commercial 
speech restrictions even in vice advertising cases, and not just in general 
commercial speech cases.
 
153
2.  Alcohol Advertising 
 
a.  Alcohol Consumption in America 
After Prohibition ended, alcohol opponents continued to push for 
increased alcohol regulation, citing the harms of youth drinking.154  
Alcohol lobbyists scored a significant victory during the Vietnam era when 
several states set the legal drinking age at eighteen or nineteen,155 but by 
the mid-1980s, alcohol opponents successfully lobbied for federal 
legislation that effectively forced states to set their minimum drinking age 
at twenty-one.156  Today, all states have a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one.157  Despite these efforts, alcohol remains readily available to those 
under twenty-one, and underage and abusive drinking by college students is 
a major concern for states and universities.158
 
 148. See id. at 180–81. 
 
 149. See id. (discussing how the district court upheld the statute as applied to the 
broadcasters under Central Hudson, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed). 
 150. See id. at 184–87. 
 151. See id. at 188–95. 
 152. See id. at 191–92 (finding inconsistency because the government was very 
supportive of tribal casinos while limiting private casinos). 
 153. See Nelson, supra note 37, at 54–55 (discussing how Greater New Orleans halted 
the Court’s paternalist stance towards gambling restrictions). 
 154. See Judith G. McMullen, Underage Drinking:  Does Current Policy Make Sense?, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 333, 338 (2006) (noting how Prohibition left lasting attitudes 
about the harmful effects of alcohol consumption). 
 155. See id. at 339 (noting that one of the reasons people argued for an eighteen-year-old 
drinking age during the Vietnam War era was that eighteen-year-olds were eligible for the 
draft); see also HENRY WECHSLER & BERNICE WUETHRICH, DYING TO DRINK:  CONFRONTING 
BINGE DRINKING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 30 (2002). 
 156. See McMullen, supra note 154, at 339. 
 157. See id. (noting the nationwide drinking age). 
 158. See Elissa R. Weitzman, Controlling Misuse of Alcohol by College Youth:  
Paradigms and Paradoxes for Prevention, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL 
159–69 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008). 
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The Supreme Court and lower courts generally accept that the individual 
and societal harms associated with alcohol abuse are so numerous that there 
is always a substantial government interest in regulating alcohol 
advertisements.159  This idea is rooted in the notion that the government can 
regulate health hazards.160
Binge drinking, or heavy episodic drinking, is rampant among these 
college students aged eighteen to twenty-four.
 
161  A recent study found that 
approximately 50 percent of college students aged eighteen to twenty report 
binge drinking.162
b.  Alcohol Advertising and the First Amendment 
 
Alcohol advertising is a highly regulated industry, with the FTC and 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives both overseeing 
alcohol advertising.163  Despite this dual oversight, alcohol advertising is 
the most advertised vice activity in the United States.164
The Supreme Court first indirectly considered the constitutionality of 
alcohol advertising restrictions in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor 
Control Commission of Ohio.
 
165  Queensgate involved a prohibition 
regarding off-premises advertisements of alcoholic beverage prices.166  The 
Ohio Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the 
prohibition, stating that the legislature was permitted by its power under the 
Twenty-first Amendment to promulgate the prohibition.  The Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal, stating that there was no substantive federal 
question, which technically was an affirmance of the Ohio court’s ruling.167  
This dismissal created confusion among the circuit courts regarding what 
the relationship is between the First and Twenty-first Amendments in the 
alcohol advertising arena.168
 
 159. See Marc L. Sherman, Note, We Can Share the Women, We Can Share the Wine:  
The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising on Television, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1120–21 
(1985) (stating that the substantial government interest in regulating alcohol is not debated). 
 
 160. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) (noting that the government 
can regulate health hazards, but must still respect constitutional limits). 
 161. The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has defined binge drinking 
as “consuming 5 or more drinks (male), or 4 or more drinks (female), in about 2 hours.” See 
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., What Colleges Need to 
Know:  An Update on College Drinking Research (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/Publications/EducationTrainingMaterials/Documents/1College_B
ulletin-508_361C4E.pdf (noting the prevalence and harmful effects of binge drinking). 
 162. See WECHSLER, supra note 155, at 10. 
 163. See Sherman, supra note 159, at 1110–13. 
 164. See WECHSLER, supra note 155, at 10. 
 165. 459 U.S. 807 (1982). 
 166. See Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio, 433 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 
1982) (the state decision). 
 167. See Mark Steffey, Tension Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments in State 
Regulation of Alcohol Advertising, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1439–51 (1984). 
 168. See id. at 1434–37 (noting how, in subsequent cases, the Court’s dismissal in 
Queensgate caused confusion by implying that states had authority over liquor 
advertisements through the Twenty-first Amendment, without addressing the relationship 
between the Twenty-first and First Amendments in the area of alcohol advertising). 
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The Court clarified its position on the constitutionality of restrictions on 
alcohol advertising in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.169  In Rubin, the 
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of section 205(e)(2) of the 
Federal Alcohol Administration Act,170 which banned beer manufacturers 
from disclosing alcohol content on their labels.171  Coors Brewing 
Company filed suit, claiming that the federal statute was a violation of the 
First Amendment, as an unlawful abridgment of commercial free speech.172  
The government asserted two substantial interests in the regulation:  (1) 
section 205(e)(2) curbs “‘strength wars’” between beer manufacturers;173 
and (2) section 205(e)(2) aids state efforts to control alcohol 
consumption.174  Applying the Central Hudson test, imputed from general 
commercial speech cases, the Court found that the speech in question was 
lawful and not misleading, and that the government had a substantial 
interest in prohibiting alcohol content information on beer labels to prevent 
“strength wars.”175
For the third prong, the Court applied the standard set forth in Edenfield, 
and found that the Government did not meet its burden to prove that section 
205(e)(2) directly and materially advanced its stated interest in preventing 
strength wars between beer manufacturers because alcohol content was 
allowed in beer advertisements but not on labels, and descriptive terms 
indicating a high alcohol content were allowed but not the content itself.
 
 176  
Additionally, the Court did not agree that Coors’s pursuit of litigation 
against section 205(e)(2) evinced a plan to display alcohol content on beer 
labels to facilitate “strength wars.”177  In its holding, the Court 
distinguished its reasoning in Posadas regarding whether to defer to 
legislative judgment.178
 
 169. 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (holding that a federal regulation prohibiting beer labels from 
displaying alcohol content was an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment). 
  In Rubin, rather than deferring to the federal 
agency’s judgment, the Court independently assessed whether the ban met 
the third prong based on the evidence that the government provided to 
support its position, and concluded that the statute did not directly advance 
 170. 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2006). 
 171. See id. at 478–79 (discussing how the challenged statute prohibited beer labels from 
including the alcohol content of the beverage on the label). 
 172. See id. (noting how Coors filed suit after unsuccessfully petitioning to print alcohol 
content on their beer labels). 
 173. See id. at 483–84 (identifying the government’s argument that allowing beer 
manufacturers to display alcohol content on beer labels will lead to the manufacturers 
competing for customers on the basis of that alcohol content, so that by prohibiting the 
alcohol content, the government is decreasing the number of consumers who choose a beer 
based on its alcohol content). 
 174. See id. at 485–86. 
 175. See id. at 483–86 (internal citations omitted). 
 176. See id. at 486–89. 
 177. “Strength wars” referred to the government’s concern that alcohol manufacturers 
were seeking to display alcohol content on labels solely to compete for market share based 
on alcohol content. Id. at 483. 
 178. See id. at 482 n.2 (“Neither Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft an 
exception to the Central Hudson standard . . . .”). 
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the government’s interest because it was irrational.179  This displayed how 
the Court was now willing to use its own judgment to question legislative 
bans rather than simply deferring to legislative judgment as it did in 
Posadas.180
Additionally, the Court held that the statute failed the fourth prong of 
Central Hudson, finding that a number of alternatives to the statute existed 
that “would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections for 
commercial speech.”
 
181  This was an indirect repudiation of the Court’s 
reasoning in Posadas, because there the Court simply accepted the 
legislature’s ability to impose a ban as evidence that the ban was 
reasonable.182  This was also a tightening of the fourth prong standard set 
forth in Fox.183  The Court thus concluded that Section 205(e)(2) was 
unconstitutional.  The Court’s decision in Rubin was a setback to those 
calling for a vice advertising exception in commercial speech cases.184
In 1996, the Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of restrictions 
on alcohol advertising in 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island.
 
185  In 44 
Liquormart, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of two Rhode Island 
statutes prohibiting liquor advertisements from displaying prices.186  The 
petitioners in 44 Liquormart brought suit in Rhode Island district court, 
claiming that the two Rhode Island statutes prohibiting price advertising for 
alcoholic beverages violated the First Amendment.187
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed its position that it would not create a 
vice advertising exception to the commercial speech doctrine.
 
188  
Additionally, the Court noted that absolute bans on certain types of 
commercial speech, like the one at issue in 44 Liquormart, should be 
evaluated more rigorously than a partial ban or less stringent regulation.189
 
 179. Id. at 488 (reiterating that the Government’s scheme was irrational). 
  
The Court opined that the state’s interest in keeping alcohol prices high to 
 180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court deferred to 
legislative judgment in Posadas); see also Hinegardner, supra note 97, at 539–42 (discussing 
how Rubin was a repudiation of the reasoning in Posadas). 
 181. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491. 
 182. See supra notes 134–142 and accompanying text (discussing Posadas). 
 183. Compare Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) 
(explicitly rejecting the least restrictive alternative standard for the fourth prong of the 
commercial speech test when determining to uphold a governmental regulation), with Rubin, 
514 U.S. at 491 (applying the least restrictive alternative standard for the fourth prong of the 
commercial speech test, and ultimately holding that the government restriction was 
unconstitutional). 
 184. See Devore, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that this “delivered the quietus to the so-
called vice exception”); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 481–82. 
 185. 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a Rhode Island state ban on advertising alcohol 
prices was an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment). 
 186. See id. at 489–90 (noting that the first Rhode Island statute prohibited alcohol 
beverage price advertisements in Rhode Island and that the second prohibited media or 
advertising companies from advertising alcohol prices in all newspapers, periodicals, 
broadcast advertisements, and other businesses located in Rhode Island). 
 187. See id. at 493–94. 
 188. See id. at 501–05. 
 189. See id. at 501 (stating that the burden on the State is greater when determining the 
constitutionality of a complete ban). 
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avoid increased consumption at lower levels was substantial, but warned 
that for the state to meet the third prong of Central Hudson, it would have 
to present evidence that the ban had a significant impact on reducing 
alcohol rates.190  The Court agreed with the state’s argument that 
commonsense judgment supported the claim that prohibiting price 
advertising would maintain higher prices, but concluded that the lack of 
evidentiary support prevented the state from satisfying the third prong.191  
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, further noted that 
reliance only on commonsense arguments would amount to engaging in 
“speculation or conjecture.”192
The Supreme Court also held that the fourth prong of Central Hudson 
was not met, given the large availability of alternatives that could aid the 
state’s interest in temperance promotion.
 
193  Rejecting its reasoning in 
Posadas, the Court held that legislative judgment was not enough to satisfy 
the burden of the fourth Central Hudson prong.194  Finally, the Court 
rejected Rhode Island’s argument that since it has superior authority to 
completely ban alcohol, it could restrict alcohol advertisements, moving 
further from the Court’s decision in Posadas.195
3.  Tobacco Advertising 
 
The Supreme Court’s most recent vice advertising case, Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,196 addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on 
tobacco advertising.  The Court reaffirmed and expanded the four-part 
Central Hudson test, rejecting the view that the government can regulate 
advertising to discourage unhealthy human behaviors.197  Tobacco 
advertisements have been the focus of far more litigation than alcohol 
advertisements.198
In Lorillard, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of two 
Massachusetts regulations.
 
199
 
 190. See id. at 505. 
  One restricted outdoor tobacco 
advertisements, prohibiting tobacco advertisements within 1,000 feet of 
 191. See id. at 505–07. 
 192. See id. at 507 & n.18 (noting that in other alcohol-related cases, the Court had not 
upheld alcohol advertising restrictions where the government relied on speculative evidence 
to support its claims about a ban’s impact on consumption). 
 193. See id. at 507. 
 194. See id. at 509–10 (concluding “that a state legislature does not have the broad 
discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes”). 
 195. Compare id. at 511 (“Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas . . . banning 
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.”), with supra note 
142 and accompanying text (discussing how the Posadas Court noted that the power to ban 
includes the lesser power to heavily regulate). 
 196. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 197. See id. at 553–55, 561. 
 198. See generally Calvert et al., supra note 17.  Much of this early litigation did not 
center on the Central Hudson analysis and is beyond the scope of this Note, so it will not be 
discussed here. See id. 
 199. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534–35. 
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schools or playgrounds.200  The second regulation sharply restricted on-site 
tobacco advertisements by requiring that establishments place tobacco 
advertisements at least five feet above the ground to ensure that children 
could not see them.201  Massachusetts claimed that the state’s interest in the 
restriction was to decrease tobacco use by children because tobacco 
products constitute a health hazard.202  The majority held that the first two 
prongs were met because the speech in question was lawful and because the 
government had a substantial interest in reducing youth demand for tobacco 
products.203
The bulk of the Court’s analysis focused on the third and fourth 
prongs.
 
204  First, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the outdoor 
advertising restrictions and found that the third Central Hudson prong was 
met, because the government provided sufficient anecdotal evidence 
showing a direct link between advertising and youth demand for tobacco 
products.205  However, the Court did not find that the fourth prong was met 
because the ban was so broad.206  Despite accepting a broad ban under the 
fourth prong in Fox,207 the Lorillard Court expressed unease with the fact 
that the regulation on outdoor tobacco advertising effectively constituted a 
complete ban.208  The Court noted that adults have an interest in receiving 
information about cigar and smokeless tobacco products because adult use 
of these products is lawful, just as manufacturers and retailers have an 
interest in conveying information.209  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, expressed concern that the regulation restricted 
speech that adults desired.210  Finally, the Court identified several 
alternative means by which the state could advance its interest in reducing 
youth tobacco product use.211
Next, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the on-site advertising 
regulations and concluded that the third prong was not met because the 
regulation’s scheme was irrational and inconsistent.
 
212  The Court also 
found that the on-site restriction did not meet the fourth prong because it 
was overbroad and limited adults’ access to information.213
 
 200. See id. at 553, 556. 
 
 201. See id. at 566. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. at 555. 
 204. See id. at 560–66. 
 205. See id. at 561. 
 206. See id. at 561–63 (holding that the ban was broad because it affected very large 
portions of metropolitan areas in Massachusetts). 
 207. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Lorillard, 533 U.S at 561–66 (noting that the ban would prevent cigar and 
smokeless tobacco advertising in a majority of Massachusetts’s metropolitan areas). 
 209. See id. at 564. 
 210. See id. at 528–30 (discussing tobacco restrictions and competing interests). 
 211. See id. at 561. 
 212. See id. at 566 (concluding that the on-site advertisements were irrational because 
children could look up and still see the advertisements). 
 213. See id. at 564, 567. 
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Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in judgment, used Lorillard to 
reiterate his view that commercial speech should be subject to the same 
protection as noncommercial speech.214  Justice Thomas stated that 
advertising restrictions should not be used to promote any interest besides a 
“fair bargaining process.”215  Additionally, Justice Thomas explicitly 
rejected suggestions for a “vice” exception to the First Amendment.216
II.  THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE THIRD AND FOURTH CIRCUITS 
 
Part II examines the circuit split between the Third and Fourth Circuits 
regarding the proper application of Central Hudson to determine the 
constitutionality of governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in 
college student publications.  First, Part II details the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Pitt News v. Pappert,217 which followed Supreme Court 
precedent on this issue and concluded that a prohibition on alcohol 
advertisements in college student publications was a violation of the First 
Amendment.  Next, Part II discusses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Swecker,218
A.  The Third Circuit Holds that Prohibitions on Alcohol Advertisements 
in College Student Publications Are Not Valid Restrictions 
on Commercial Speech 
 which departed 
from the Supreme Court’s standard for evaluating vice advertising 
restrictions.  The Fourth Circuit held that a restriction on alcohol 
advertising in college student publications was not facially unconstitutional. 
In Pitt News, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania regulation 
restricting alcohol advertising in college student publications was an 
unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of expression as applied to 
Pitt News, a University of Pittsburgh student publication, following the 
Court’s reasoning in Rubin,219 44 Liquormart,220 and Lorillard.221
1.  Act 199:  The Challenged Pennsylvania Statute 
 
In 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended Pennsylvania’s Liquor 
Code, enacting what is popularly known as “Act 199.”222
 
 214. See id. at 577, 588–89 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining that allowing restrictions on 
tobacco advertising to protect children was a slippery slope, which could lead to restrictions 
on fast food advertising to prevent child obesity or restrictions on alcohol advertising to 
prevent underage drinking). 
  The legislative 
 215. See id. at 577, 588–89. 
 216. See id. (calling for strict scrutiny review to evaluate the constitutionality of 
restrictions on commercial speech). 
 217. 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 218. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010). 
 219. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra Part I.D.3. 
 222. See Pitt News v. Pappert (Pitt News II), 379 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2004).  Act 199 
states, in relevant part: 
§ 4-498. Unlawful Advertising 
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history surrounding the Act does not explain its purpose; however, 
Pennsylvania asserted in district court proceedings that Act 199 was 
intended to address underage drinking on college campuses, as well as 
campus binge drinking by both underage students and adult students.223
Act 199 regulated alcohol advertisements in college student 
publications.
 
224  Criminal sanctions were imposed on those who violated 
Act 199.225  The Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement (BLCE) was 
responsible for investigating Act 199 violations and facilitating arrests.226  
The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (LCB) was responsible for 
interpreting Pennsylvania state laws binding on the BLCE, and the LCB 
interpreted Act 199 as only being enforceable against alcohol advertisers, 
such as retailers or restaurants advertising alcohol in college student 
publications, but not the publications in which the advertisements were 
placed.227  Additionally, in an informational publication about Act 199, the 
LCB clarified that advertisements for a licensed alcohol vendor that did not 
contain any beverage references were permissible.228  Finally, the LCB 
stated that Act 199 did not implicate magazines and newspapers circulated 
on college campuses that had no connection to the campuses.229
2.  The Pitt News Alleges that Act 199 Is a Violation 
of Its Constitutional Rights 
 
In December 1997, the Fuel & Fuddle restaurant canceled its 
longstanding contract with the Pitt News after being cited for an Act 199 
violation.230  The News, in an effort to protect its other advertisers, stopped 
accepting alcohol advertisements, and tried unsuccessfully to convince 
liquor retailers to submit advertisements that complied with Act 199.231
 
(e) The following shall apply to all alcoholic beverage . . . advertising: 
  In 
(4) The use in any advertisement of alcoholic beverages of any subject 
matter, language or slogan directed to minors to promote consumption of 
alcoholic beverages is prohibited.  Nothing in this section shall be deemed to 
restrict or prohibit any advertisement of alcoholic beverages to those persons 
of legal drinking age. 
(5) No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in any 
booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, periodical, brochure, 
circular or other similar publication published by, for or in behalf of any 
educational institution. 
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e) (West Supp. 2011). 
 223. See Pitt News v. Fisher (Pitt News I), 215 F.3d 354, 358 (3d Cir. 2000). See 
generally supra Part I.D (discussing the prevalence of underage and binge drinking on 
college campuses). 
 224. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 357. 
 225. See id. at 357–58 (discussing how Act 199 violations were misdemeanors and 
punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment); see also Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 102 
(same). 
 226. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 358–59. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 102. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359. 
 231. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103 (noting how other advertisers canceled their 
advertising contracts with the Pitt News). 
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1998, The News suffered a $17,000 advertising revenue loss, which 
effectively shortened the paper,232 impeded its ability to make capital 
expenditures, and had other deleterious effects.233
In April 1999, the Pitt News sued the Pennsylvania Attorney General, the 
BCLE Director, and the LCB Chairman in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the enforcement of Act 199 
violated its constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with the 
rights of the paper’s readers and advertisers.
 
234  After a hearing to 
determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the district court 
denied the News’s motion, holding that the paper lacked standing to 
challenge Act 199’s constitutionality on behalf of its readers and 
advertisers, and had not suffered any personal injury, and therefore could 
not assert First Amendment claims on its own behalf.235
In June 2000, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction on appeal.
 
236  The Third Circuit agreed that the 
News did not have standing to assert third-party claims; however, the court 
determined that since the News had suffered an advertising loss, it had 
standing to challenge Act 199.237  Despite this, the Third Circuit concluded 
that the preliminary injunction had been properly denied.238  The Pitt News 
then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which 
was denied.239
3.  Act 199:  Unconstitutional as Applied to the Pitt News 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 2001, the parties 
cross-motioned for summary judgment.240  On February 13, 2003, the 
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.241  The Pitt 
News appealed this decision to the Third Circuit, which exercised plenary 
review of the district court’s order.242
The Third Circuit panel held that despite Pennsylvania’s arguments that 
the college student publications could still print unpaid alcohol 
advertisements, “[i]mposing a financial burden on a speaker based on the 
 
 
 232. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359 (noting that because the Pitt News was required to 
run an equal proportion of advertisements and text, the reduction in advertisements forced 
the paper to limit the amount of space in which it could print articles and photographs). 
 233. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103. 
 234. See id.; see also Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 359. 
 235. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 103 (stating that the paper did not suffer any injury 
because it could still publish what it wanted, as long as it did not accept paid advertisements 
violating the ban, and holding that the paper could not allege First Amendment rights on 
behalf of its readers and advertisers). 
 236. See id. 
 237. See Pitt News I, 215 F.3d at 362 (noting that the Pitt News had standing to bring a 
claim because its loss of advertising revenue was a redressable injury). 
 238. See id. at 366 (noting that the Pitt News did not have a good chance at succeeding on 
the merits). 
 239. See Pitt News v. Fisher, 531 U.S. 1113 (2001). 
 240. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 104. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See id. 
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content of the speaker’s expression is a content-based restriction of 
expression and must be analyzed as such.”243  Concluding that Act 199 was 
a restriction of commercial speech, the Third Circuit panel applied Central 
Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of the restriction.244  It noted that 
the first two prongs of the test were satisfied:  (1) the First Amendment 
protected the commercial speech in question; and (2) the governmental 
interest was, “at minimum, ‘substantial.’”245
The court concluded that the third and fourth prongs of the test were not 
satisfied.
 
246  According to the Third Circuit, in an opinion written by then-
Circuit Judge Samuel Alito, the ban did not directly and materially advance 
the governmental interest in lowering underage and abusive drinking rates 
by college students because it only restricted one form of media targeting 
college students.  Nor was the ban narrowly tailored to achieve its stated 
objective of lowering underage drinking rates because the majority of 
readers were of legal drinking age.247  Additionally, the court resolved that 
the restriction further violated the First Amendment by imposing a financial 
burden on a distinct part of the media; namely, university media.248
In the Third Circuit’s analysis of the third prong, it established that the 
Pennsylvania statute did not directly and materially advance the 
government’s interest.
 
249  The court stated that Pennsylvania’s burden 
under the third prong would not be “‘satisfied by mere speculation or 
conjecture.’”250  Additionally, the court resolved that a challenged 
restriction would not be upheld if it facilitated “ineffective or remote 
support for the government’s purpose,”251 or has only a small likelihood 
that it will further the state’s interest.252  This analysis was consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s third prong analysis in the later Central Hudson 
commercial speech cases, decided after the Supreme Court took a less 
deferential approach, including the recent vice advertising cases.253
To meet its third prong burden, Pennsylvania claimed that the 
“elimination of alcoholic beverage ads from The Pitt News and other 
publications connected with the University will slacken the demand for 
alcohol by Pitt students.”
 
254
 
 243. Id. at 106. 
  This claim fell short of the state’s third prong 
 244. See id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 107–09. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See id. at 107. 
 250. See id.; supra notes 118–22 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Edenfield; 
see also supra Part I.D.3 (describing the Court’s holding in Lorillard). 
 251. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107 (internal citations omitted). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
 254. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107 (noting how Pennsylvania argued that, because 
alcohol advertising encourages consumption, Act 199 discourages underage and abusive 
drinking by limiting access to alcohol advertisements by underage college students).  The 
Third Circuit did not agree with this assertion because Act 199 only applied to a very narrow 
sector of the college campus media, and Pennsylvania failed to provide evidence that the 
restriction had the intended effect of reducing underage and abusive drinking. See id.  
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burden,255 similar to the result in Rubin and 44 Liquormart.256  According 
to Judge Alito, this claim lacked empirical evidence, and relied on “nothing 
more than ‘speculation’ and ‘conjecture’” to support Pennsylvania’s 
contentions about the effectiveness of Act 199 in reducing underage and 
abusive drinking.257
Additionally, the Third Circuit expressed discomfort with the fact that 
students were still subject to alcohol advertisements in a variety of media, 
such as television, radio, and other publications, such that limiting 
advertisements in newspapers would not significantly reduce exposure.
 
258  
This demonstrated an inconsistency in Pennsylvania’s attitude to alcohol 
laws,259 similar to that which the Supreme Court highlighted in Rubin.260  
In Rubin, the restriction prohibiting alcohol content on beer bottles, but not 
malt liquor bottles, was determined to be an inconsistency in the 
government’s reasoning.261  Here, the Third Circuit used Rubin to discuss 
how this inconsistency in Pennsylvania’s restriction supported the result 
that the Pennsylvania legislature had not met their burden under Central 
Hudson’s third prong.262
Analyzing the fourth prong, the Third Circuit held that Act 199 was “not 
adequately tailored to achieve [Pennsylvania’s] asserted objectives,” 
concluding that the Act was not a reasonable fit between the state’s interest 
and the narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest.
 
263  The court 
stated that the Act was both over-inclusive by restricting lawful adults on 
campus from accessing alcohol advertisements in college publications, as 
well as under-inclusive by only limiting college publications, without 
addressing other media on campus through which underage and lawful 
students were exposed to alcohol advertisements.264  Additionally, the 
Third Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lorillard265
 
Additionally, the Third Circuit decided that it was counterintuitive to believe that Act 199 
would reduce college students’ demands for alcohol, and that Pennsylvania failed to provide 
evidence that Act 199 would make it harder for students to find alcohol retailers near 
campus. See id. 
 to 
show that the restriction was not narrowly tailored, pointing out that like the 
 255. See id. (noting that Pennsylvania used a commonsense argument:  because alcohol 
advertisements generally increased demand for alcohol, restricting advertisements should 
decrease demands).  The Third Circuit did not dispute the assertion that alcohol advertising 
encourages consumption; however, the court stated that the converse was unsupportable 
without empirical evidence proving the claim. See id. 
 256. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 257. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107–08. 
 258. See id. at 107. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 169–84 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 107. 
 263. See id. at 108. 
 264. See id. at 108–09. 
 265. See id. at 108 (noting how the Supreme Court in Lorillard found that the restriction 
was not narrowly tailored because it limited access to adults, who could legally buy tobacco 
products); see also supra Part I.D.3 and accompanying text. 
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advertising restrictions in Lorillard, Act 199 prevented adults who could 
lawfully purchase alcohol from accessing alcohol advertisements.266
Finally, the Third Circuit identified several alternatives to the challenged 
restriction in Pitt News that would better serve Pennsylvania’s interest.
 
267  
The court stated that the most direct method available to Pennsylvania 
would be to fully enforce alcohol beverage laws on college campuses.268
The Third Circuit concluded that Act 199 violated the First Amendment 
for a second reason:  it imposed a financial burden on a narrow sector of the 
media, media associated with a college or university.
 
269  The court decided 
that Act 199 was presumptively unconstitutional, and required Pennsylvania 
to show that Act 199 was necessary to further its substantial interest in the 
regulation, which it did not do.270  As such, the court determined that this 
was a second, independent reason for Act 199’s unconstitutionality.271
B.  The Fourth Circuit Holds that Restrictions on Certain Alcohol 
Advertisements in College Student Publications Are Valid 
 
1.  The Challenged Virginia Administrative Code 
The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, a subsidiary of the 
Department of Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control, is responsible for 
regulating alcohol advertisements throughout Virginia.272  With this 
regulatory authority, it enacted an alcohol advertising regulation in the 
1970s, updated in the 1990s, which prohibited “various types of 
advertisements for alcohol in any college student publication.”273
 
 266. See Pitt News II, 379 F.3d at 108 (finding that the Pennsylvania restriction was too 
broad because it banned alcohol advertisements in all university publications, even those 
with a substantial majority of readers who were over the age of twenty-one). 
  The 
restriction included “any college or university publication . . . that is:  (1) 
prepared, edited or published primarily by its students; (2) sanctioned as a 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. (discussing research that showed just how lax enforcement of alcohol 
beverage control laws were on college campuses, which the Court determined was the most 
direct way to reduce underage and abusive drinking on college campuses). 
 269. See id. at 109–12. 
 270. See id. at 111. 
 271. See id. at 111–12. 
 272. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010). 
 273. See id. at 587 (discussing the challenged Virginia statute). Section A(2) of the 
Virginia statute states the following: 
Advertisements of alcoholic beverages are not allowed in college student 
publications unless in reference to a dining establishment. . . .  A ‘college student 
publication’ is defined as any college or university publication that is prepared, 
edited or published primarily by students at such institution, is sanctioned as a 
curricular or extra-curricular activity by such institution and which is distributed or 
intended to be distributed primarily to persons under 21 years of age. 
3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40(A)(2) (2008).  Section A(3) states: 
Advertisements of alcoholic beverages are prohibited in publications not of general 
circulation which are distributed or intended to be distributed primarily to persons 
under 21 years of age, except in reference to a dining establishment . . . . 
Id. § 5-20-40(A)(3). 
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curricular or extracurricular activity; and (3) distributed or intended to be 
distributed primarily to persons under 21 years of age.”274  Regulated 
publications could not print any alcohol advertisements, including those for 
“beer, wine or mixed beverages,” unless the advertisement was for a dining 
institution.275  Virginia claimed that this regulation sought to further its 
interest in reducing underage or dangerous consumption of alcohol on 
college campuses.276
2.  The Eastern District of Virginia Uses Pitt News to Find 
the Virginia Restriction Invalid 
 
Two Virginia publications affected by this advertising regulation, the 
Collegiate Times and the Cavalier Daily, classified as college student 
publications despite having a majority of readership over twenty-one, 
challenged the statute as a violation of their First Amendment rights.277  
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the 
statute was facially unconstitutional as an invalid ban on commercial 
speech.278
In Educational Media Co., the district court relied on the analysis in Pitt 
News.
 
279  First, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the first Central 
Hudson prong was met, as the speech in question was both lawful and 
truthful.280  The court then agreed with the defendants regarding the second 
prong, stating that reducing underage and excessive drinking by college 
students is a substantial government interest.281
A significant portion of the district court opinion was dedicated to the 
third Central Hudson prong, the direct advancement requirement.
 
282  
Noting that the government bears the burden to demonstrate this 
requirement, the district court relied on the post-Edenfield line of 
commercial speech cases to ascertain what evidentiary showing was 
required.283
 
 274. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 587 (internal citations omitted). 
  Although the defendants suggested that the district court 
 275. See id. (noting that even though dining establishments could submit advertisements, 
they were restricted to using the following terms to reference alcohol beverages:  “A.B.C. 
on-premises, beer, wine, mixed beverages, cocktails, or any combination of these words.”). 
 276. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., v. Swecker, No. 3:06CV396, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45590, at *33–34 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 277. See id. at *29. 
 278. See id. at *57. 
 279. See id. at *32; see also supra Part II.A. 
 280. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *30–32 (relying on the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning in Pitt News, which held that since the activity in question was lawful, 
and the speech not misleading, it was clearly protected by the First Amendment); see also 
supra Part II.A. 
 281. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *33–34; see also supra notes 
161–62 and accompanying text (detailing problems with underage and binge drinking on 
college campuses). 
 282. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *34–37; see also supra notes 
71–89 and accompanying text (discussing Central Hudson). 
 283. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *34–36. 
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simply determine if the statute was reasonable,284 the court concluded that 
this reasonableness standard utilized in Posadas was no longer good law,285 
employing Pitt News to show how circuit courts read the direct 
advancement requirement narrowly.286
The district court carefully scrutinized Virginia’s evidence showing that 
the ban directly and materially advanced the government’s interest in 
reducing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses.
 
287  
Virginia provided evidence consisting of one expert, several college 
administrators, and statistics regarding the prevalence and negative effects 
of underage and excessive drinking on college campuses.288  The expert, 
Dr. Henry Saffer, presented his research, which found that limiting alcohol 
advertisements would reduce alcohol and binge drinking rates in adults 
aged 18–20.289  Dr. Saffer believed that college newspapers were a special 
type of media, with no reasonable substitute;290 thus, banning 
advertisements in college publications would reduce alcohol consumption 
because advertisers could not substitute another medium for college 
newspapers.291  The district court did not find this argument persuasive.292
The college administrators, citing statistical evidence on underage and 
binge drinking rates, highlighted the problem that Virginia faced with 
drinking on college campuses.
 
293  However, the district court was interested 
in reviewing evidence showing how the ban itself affected drinking rates 
from its enactment in the 1970s.294  The lack of evidence showing the 
impact of the ban and similar advertising restrictions persuaded the district 
court that the regulation did not directly advance the government’s interest 
in reducing underage and excessive college drinking rates to a material 
degree.295  Therefore, the district court concluded that the third Central 
Hudson prong was not met.296
 
 284. See id. at *34–47 (noting how Virginia argued that the district court defer to 
legislative judgment in crafting the ban, relying on Posadas); see also supra notes 
 
135–42 
and accompanying text (discussing Posadas). 
 285. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *37–38. 
 286. See id. at *38 (noting how the Fourth Circuit in Pitt News expressed that the very 
fact that college students were still exposed to a torrent of advertisements detracted from the 
government’s direct advancement argument). 
 287. See id. at *40–47. 
 288. See id. at *40–44 (discussing Virginia’s evidence). 
 289. See id. at *40–46. 
 290. See id. 
 291. See id. (discussing how Dr. Saffer’s conclusions depended on college students not 
exposed to any media containing alcohol advertisements). 
 292. See id. at *46 (noting how Dr. Saffer’s testimony ignored the reality that college 
students now live in a multimedia environment, exposed to television, radio, and other media 
outlets, all of which include alcohol advertisements). 
 293. See id. at *41–45; see also supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing 
alcohol abuse among college students). 
 294. See Educ. Media Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45590, at *42 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 295. See id. at *47. 
 296. See id. 
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Applying the fourth prong of Central Hudson, the district court 
determined that the regulation was not narrowly tailored.297  The plaintiffs 
used the Commonwealth’s expert to show the availability of alternatives; 
Dr. Saffer admitted that taxing alcohol and counter-advertising would serve 
the same state interest.298  Additionally, Virginia did not use any evidence 
to show that the restriction was narrowly tailored.299
3.  The Fourth Circuit Reverses, Directly Contradicting the Third Circuit 
 
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Educational Media Co. from Pitt News, 
stating that Pitt News was an “as applied challenge.”300  The court stated 
that unlike an as-applied challenge, in a facial challenge, the burden for the 
government is lower, because a court must simply determine as a question 
of law whether the government meets its burden under Central Hudson, 
without considering the statute’s “impact on the plaintiff asserting the facial 
challenge.”301  The court then went on to apply the Central Hudson test.302
Like the Third Circuit in Pitt News, the Fourth Circuit found that the first 
two prongs were met.
 
303  The speech in question was lawful and not 
misleading, and the court agreed that the government’s interest in reducing 
underage and abusive drinking on college campuses was substantial.304
The Fourth Circuit, unlike the Third Circuit in Pitt News, relied on 
“history, consensus, and common sense” to find that there was a direct link 
between advertising bans on college publications and a decreased demand 
for alcohol among college students.
 
305  The Fourth Circuit found support 
for its treatment of “history, consensus, and simple common sense” in 
Burson v. Freeman,306 a First Amendment case involving non-commercial 
speech in which the Court upheld a “campaign-free zone” within 100 feet of 
a polling place.307
The Fourth Circuit found that the relationship between alcohol 
advertising and demand for advertising would not justify an advertising ban 
in every situation involving a harmful activity, but found that the 
relationship in Educational Media Co. did support the ban.
 
308  The 
justification given was that the ban here was justified because “college 
student publications primarily target college students.”309
 
 297. See id. at *48. 
  As such, the 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. at *53. 
 300. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 588 n.4 (4th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010) (noting that the district court used both terms but 
determining that the district court meant to find the statute facially unconstitutional). 
 301. Id. at 588. 
 302. See id. 
 303. Id. at 589. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992). 
 307. See id. at 211.  This argument was similar to an argument rejected by the Supreme 
Court in 44 Liquormart. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 308. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590. 
 309. See id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Fourth Circuit stated that it was “counterintuitive for alcohol vendors to 
spend their money on advertisements in newspapers with relatively limited 
circulation, directed primarily at college students, if they believed that these 
ads would not increase demands by college students.”310
Finally, in finding that the third prong of Central Hudson was met, the 
Fourth Circuit stated that the college publications challenging the ban had 
not presented any evidence to refute Virginia’s assertion that alcohol 
advertisements in college student publications would increase the demand 
for alcohol among those college students.
 
311  Thus, in a marked departure 
from the precedent of the Third Circuit and Supreme Court, the Fourth 
Circuit shifted the burden of the third prong to those challenging a 
restriction, stating that it was up to the plaintiffs to dispute the link between 
the Virginia statute and college student drinking rates.312  This reasoning 
departs from most vice advertising cases applying Central Hudson.313
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the fourth prong of Central 
Hudson was met.
 
314  The statute was narrowly tailored because it only 
affected college student publications whose readership is predominantly 
under twenty-one years of age, and it only banned certain types of alcohol 
advertisements.315  Additionally, the Court noted that the ban here was not 
a complete ban, as it only restricted certain types of alcoholic beverages in 
certain publications.316  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the statute 
was facially constitutional.317
4.  The Dissent:  Pitt News Should Be Followed Here 
 
The dissenting judge in Educational Media Co. district judge Norman K. 
Moon sitting by designation, stated that by applying Central Hudson in a 
manner consistent with Pitt News, both the third and fourth prongs were not 
met.318  Judge Moon noted that Virginia’s interest was reducing underage 
and abusive drinking on college campuses, not simply reducing general 
underage college student drinking.319  He stated that the challenged 
restriction was incorrectly applied to the two student publications, as both 
papers showed that the majority of their readers were over the age of 
twenty-one.320
 
 310. See id. But see supra note 
 
195 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument in 44 Liquormart). 
 311. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590 (noting that the newspapers failed to “provide 
evidence to specifically contradict this link”). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See supra notes 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Rubin and 44 Liquormart). 
 314. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 590. 
 315. See id. at 590–91. 
 316. See id. 
 317. Id. at 591. 
 318. See id. at 592–94 (Moon, J., dissenting). 
 319. Id. at 594. 
 320. See id. at 595 n.7 (arguing that this was unconstitutional as applied because both 
publications provided evidence showing that the majority of their readers were over the age 
of twenty-one). 
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Additionally, Judge Moon conducted his own analysis of the third and 
fourth prongs of Central Hudson.321  Regarding the third prong, Judge 
Moon implied that since both publications had a majority of readers over 
the age of twenty-one, the “common sense” argument relied on by the 
majority was not applicable.322  The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning regarding 
advertisers’ desire to advertise in college student publications as evidence 
that the advertising was directly linked to demand was “speculative,” and 
by exempting certain types of alcohol advertisements, the statute displayed 
an “internal inconsistency.”323
Furthermore, Judge Moon pointed out that the affidavit that the Fourth 
Circuit relied on as evidence supporting its application of the third prong 
made mention of the fact that “there is . . . very little empirical evidence that 
alcohol advertising has any effect on actual alcohol consumption,” and that 
“a ban on advertising in one medium generally results in greater advertising 
saturation in other media or forms of marketing.”
 
324  Dr. Saffer, who gave 
the affidavit, admitted that there were no studies he could point to that 
showed the effectiveness of an alcohol advertising ban in college student 
publications at reducing even general drinking rates on campus.325
Finally, Judge Moon wrote that he did not believe that the fourth prong 
was met, because the statute’s ban on certain types of alcohol 
advertisements was not the most effective way to advance the governmental 
interest, given the existence of other proven and more direct means, such as 
increasing alcohol taxes, increasing advertising warnings of the dangers of 
drinking, raising alcohol prices, and simply banning prices on alcohol 
advertisements.
 
326  He also noted that the Virginia statute singled out 
alcohol advertisements in college student publications, without attempting 
to regulate other alcohol advertisements on campus.327
III.  THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S STANDARD IS MOST CONGRUENT 
WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
 
As discussed, the Pitt News and Educational Media Co. courts applied 
the Central Hudson test differently when evaluating governmental 
restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college student publications.  Part 
III considers each Circuit’s application of the third and fourth prongs, and 
concludes that the Fourth Circuit erred in its Central Hudson application.  It 
first discusses the slight differences between the two cases and why these 
differences are not significant enough to warrant differing conclusions.  
Next, Part III examines the differing applications of Central Hudson and 
 
 321. See supra notes 71–89 and accompanying text (discussing the third and fourth 
Central Hudson prongs). 
 322. See Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 591–93. 
 323. Id. at 593–94 (discussing that the majority did not follow the Court’s third prong 
burden, established in Edenfield and all following cases); see also supra Part I for a 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving application of the third prong. 
 324. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 593 n.5 (internal citations omitted). 
 325. See id. 
 326. See id. at 596 n.8. 
 327. See id. 
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highlights why the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the third and fourth prongs 
was incorrect.  Finally, Part III concludes by proposing that the Supreme 
Court resolve the split by adopting the clear Third Circuit standard for 
evaluating governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college 
student publications. 
A.  Minor Differences Between the Two Circuit Cases 
1.  The Challenged Statutes Are Substantively Similar 
The statute that the Third Circuit analyzed, Act 199,328 was a broad ban, 
prohibiting all alcohol advertisements in any publications published for or 
on behalf of any colleges or universities.329  Act 199 was enforceable 
against alcohol retailers who published advertisements in applicable 
publications.330  Publications that circulated on college campuses but had 
no connection to those campuses were exempt.331
In contrast, the challenged restriction in Educational Media Co. 
prohibited only certain alcohol advertisements in college student 
publications,
 
332 allowing restaurants with liquor licenses to publish 
advertisements including vague references to alcohol sold on premises.333  
Despite the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the Virginia restriction was 
not a broad ban,334 the restriction broadly restricts commercial speech by 
effectively disallowing most types of alcohol advertisements in Virginia 
college student newspapers.335  Thus, although proponents of the Virginia 
restriction may argue that it has less of an impact on First Amendment 
rights, the restriction is still a broad ban limiting commercial speech 
because it affected all campus-affiliated papers and every alcohol-related 
advertisement any publication wanted to print.336
2.  The Type of Challenge Should Not Matter 
 
Unlike the Third Circuit in Pitt News, the Fourth Circuit declined to 
address whether the challenged Virginia statute was unconstitutional as 
applied to the two student publications bringing the action.337  The Fourth 
Circuit simply evaluated whether the challenged Virginia restriction was 
facially unconstitutional.338
 
 328. See supra notes 
  Unlike an as-applied challenge, a facial 
222–29 and accompanying text (discussing Act 199). 
 329. See supra notes 222–29 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text (discussing the challenged Virginia 
statute). 
 333. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning to uphold the ban). 
 335. See supra notes 189, 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing how the Fourth Circuit 
declined to hear the case as an as-applied challenge because the district court held the statute 
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challenge to the constitutionality of a commercial speech restriction can be 
resolved as a question of law when the government meets its Central 
Hudson burden.  This is significant because it allows the appellate court to 
make its own legal determinations without deferring to the district court.339
Although the majority opinion in Educational Media Co. distinguished 
Pitt News as an as-applied challenge,
 
340 this distinction is misleading.341  
Facial challenges usually succeed only by showing that the challenged law 
is unconstitutional in all applications.342  But this is not the standard for 
First Amendment cases, and does not explain why the Fourth Circuit treated 
the facial challenge differently than the Third Circuit treated the as-applied 
challenge.343
Furthermore, the Central Hudson analysis is the same whether applied in 
a facial or as-applied challenge.
 
344  Thus, although there is a difference in 
the type of challenges at issue here, the circuit split still exists regarding the 
proper application and evidentiary standard of Central Hudson when 
evaluating governmental restrictions on alcohol advertisements in college 
student publications.345
B.  The Supreme Court Should Resolve the Circuit Split by Reversing the 
Fourth Circuit and Clarifying Its Vice Advertising Stance 
 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari 
The Supreme Court denied Educational Media’s petition for certiorari.346  
Litigation continues, however, as the two college papers continue to pursue 
an as-applied challenge in the district court.347
 
facially unconstitutional). But see supra notes 
  Additionally, two other 
states still have laws restricting alcohol advertisements in college student 
publications, so that the Supreme Court may once again be called on to 
318–20 and accompanying text (noting that 
the dissent in Educational Media Co. expressed that this could have been heard as applied in 
part because the statute was incorrectly applied to the two papers bringing the suit). 
 339. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text (discussing standard for facial 
versus as-applied challenge). 
 340. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text. 
 341. The distinction is misleading because both still require the same Central Hudson 
application. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2000) (noting that the distinction between facial 
and as-applied challenges is not clear enough to warrant an automatic or controlling effect). 
 343. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text (noting that the facial challenge 
burden is lower in First Amendment challenges). 
 344. See supra notes 318–23 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra Part II. 
 346. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010). 
 347. See Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech v. Swecker, ACLU, 
http://acluva.org/176/educational-media-company-at-virginia-tech-v-swecker/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011). 
1362 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
resolve the issue.348  Therefore, despite the Court’s denial of certiorari, the 
circuit split persists and still requires resolution.349
2.  The Fourth Circuit Relied on Mere Speculation and Conjecture While 
Analyzing the Third Prong, Contradicting Supreme Court Precedent 
 
Although there is consensus on the application of the first two prongs of 
the Central Hudson test,350 the proper evidentiary standard for the third 
prong continues to plague lower courts, despite the Supreme Court’s 
clarification in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater New Orleans.351
First, the commonsense link that the Fourth Circuit relied on as evidence 
is speculative and similar to arguments previously rejected by the Court.
  This 
Note asserts that the Fourth Circuit erred in applying the third Central 
Hudson prong in three ways. 
352  
Virginia argued that the fact that advertisers were challenging the ban was 
evidence that the advertisements would increase demand and curtail the 
government’s interest.353  This same argument was made by the 
government in Rubin and rejected.354
The second way in which the Fourth Circuit erred was by accepting Dr. 
Saffer’s testimony without statistical proof of his claims as evidence that 
the advertising ban on alcohol advertisements in college student 
publications would curtail underage and excessive drinking on college 
campuses.
 
355  Dr. Saffer admittedly lacked empirical evidence to support 
his claims.356  Furthermore, as the district court noted, this argument was 
irrational because Virginia college students were still exposed to alcohol 
advertisements on campus from a variety of unregulated media outlets, 
which casts doubt on the effectiveness of this ban.357
 
 348. There are three states that currently prohibit or restrict alcohol advertisements in 
college student publications:  New Hampshire, Utah, and Virginia. See N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 179:31 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 81-1-17 (2011); 3 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (2010). 
  This displayed an 
 349. See supra Part II. 
 350. See supra notes 246–72, 303–17 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s evidentiary requirements in those cases). 
 352. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text. 
 353. Compare supra notes 308–10 (discussing Virginia’s supporting evidence, claiming 
that alcohol vendors would not advertise in college student publications if they did not 
believe that those advertisements would increase demand among college students), with 
supra notes 146–53 (noting that the Court in Greater New Orleans rejected the 
government’s argument that allowing advertising would increase demand, finding that the 
argument was too causal), 169–95 (noting how the Court in Rubin rejected similar 
speculative evidence regarding advertising and demand)  and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 177–80 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
government’s argument in Rubin). 
 355. Compare supra notes 307–09, 324–25 (discussing how the Fourth Circuit accepted 
Virginia’s evidence), with supra notes 288–96 (district court rejecting same proof because it 
found that to accept the proof as evidence would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence). 
 356. See supra notes 288–96, 323–24 (noting that the restriction had been in place for 
over thirty years when litigation began). 
 357. See supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistency in Virginia’s college alcohol policy, similar to the 
inconsistency displayed by the government’s regulatory scheme in Rubin, 
and should not have been credited.358
Finally, and most significantly, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was 
incorrect because it did not require Virginia to show statistical evidence 
proving the effectiveness of the ban.  The Virginia alcohol restriction had 
been in place for over thirty years when litigation began.
 
359  Despite this, 
Virginia was unable to provide any statistical evidence proving the 
restriction’s effectiveness at reducing underage and excessive drinking rates 
on college campuses during this time.360  The Fourth Circuit did not 
address this lack of evidence, displaying a deferential stance towards the 
legislature.  Given the Court’s precedent, it is unlikely that this ban would 
survive scrutiny by the Supreme Court.361  The Court has emphasized the 
importance of empirical support since shifting its stance on commercial 
speech in Edenfield.362  The Fourth Circuit’s decision is troubling because 
it weakens commercial speech by echoing the Court’s analysis in Posadas, 
reasoning the Court has long since repudiated.363
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit and in line with the Supreme Court, the 
Third Circuit expressed its understanding of the vice advertising subset as 
requiring the government to provide evidence to meet its burden under the 
third Central Hudson prong.
 
364  Pennsylvania made similar arguments 
when trying to uphold its restriction.365  However, the Third Circuit found 
that the lack of evidence supporting the state’s claims, along with the anti-
paternalist view the Court showed in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater 
New Orleans, required it to find that the state did not meet its burden.366
The Fourth Circuit’s reliance on commonsense and testimony lacking 
evidentiary support was a departure from recent Supreme Court vice 
advertising cases.
 
367
 
 358. See supra notes 
  Although the state does have a substantial interest in 
curtailing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses, these 
restrictions limit adults’ access to alcohol advertisements.  The Court has 
174–77 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 286–96 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s recent treatment of vice advertising bans). 
 362. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court changed its 
stance in Edenfield by shifting the burden for the third prong to the government). 
 363. Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that the Court in Posadas 
accepted paternalistic government reasoning), with supra notes 121–22 and accompanying 
text (noting that the Court required more than paternalistic reasoning in Edenfield). 
 364. See supra notes 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing how the Third Circuit 
interpreted the post-Edenfield cases as requiring evidentiary support). 
 365. See supra notes 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing how Pennsylvania made 
similar commonsense arguments as Virginia, which the Third Circuit did not accept). 
 366. See supra notes 146–53, 169–95, 249–62 and accompanying text (discussing the 
post-Edenfield vice advertising cases). 
 367. See supra notes 122, 196–206 and accompanying text. 
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indicated concern about such a situation.368  Proponents of alcohol 
advertising restrictions argue that the serious problem of underage and 
excessive binge drinking justifies limits on commercial speech in college 
publications.369  However, despite these concerns, restrictions that limit 
commercial speech should not be upheld in the absence of evidence 
showing that those restrictions directly advance the state’s interest.370  
Thus, the Third Circuit’s reasoned application of the third Central Hudson 
prong in college alcohol advertising cases should be applied.371
3.  The Fourth Circuit Improperly Placed an Evidentiary Burden on Parties 
Challenging Governmental Restrictions 
 
The Fourth Circuit also erred in its analysis of Central Hudson’s third 
prong by placing an evidentiary burden on the publications challenging 
governmental restrictions.372  The Supreme Court has established that 
government actors seeking to uphold restrictions on commercial speech 
have the burden of providing evidence to prove that the burden directly and 
materially advances the government’s interest.373  The Fourth Circuit’s 
apparent burden shift is a direct contradiction of this precedent, and should 
be reversed.374
4.  The Fourth Circuit Did Not Consider the Numerous Alternatives 
Available Under the Fourth Central Hudson Prong 
 
Under its analysis of the fourth prong, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
the restriction was narrowly tailored because it only affected college student 
publications with a majority of readers under twenty-one, and allowed 
certain advertisements referencing alcoholic beverages.375  Additionally, 
the Fourth Circuit noted that this restriction complemented the state’s other 
efforts at reducing underage and excessive drinking.376
The Supreme Court has displayed an increasingly speech-protective 
stance when analyzing the fourth prong in Central Hudson cases, even in 
vice cases.
 
377
 
 368. See supra notes 
  Although the Virginia restriction was specifically tailored 
and part of a comprehensive effort, the state did not meet its evidentiary 
burden to show how the restriction was necessary in light of the 
196–206 and accompanying text (noting how the majority in 
Lorillard was concerned with how the restriction at issue there limited the access that adults 
had to lawful information about tobacco products). 
 369. See supra Part I.D.2.a and accompanying text (noting the problems with alcohol 
policy). 
 370. See supra Part I.D. 
 371. See supra Part II.A.3 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (discussing how the Fourth Circuit 
expressed the view that the two Virginia publications did not present enough evidence 
showing why the ban did not meet the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson). 
 373. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
 374. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra Part I. 
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comprehensive effort.378  The state mentioned that it aimed at reducing 
underage and excessive drinking on college campuses includes educational 
programs and enforcement efforts.379  These types of programs have proven 
to be more effective at reducing underage and excessive college drinking; 
thus, the state should have been required to show why the commercial 
speech restriction was necessary in light of the other two programs.380  
Given the Court’s recent protection of commercial speech, the existence of 
two effective programs that do not restrict speech does not explain why a 
speech restriction is also necessary, especially since the Virginia restriction 
solely restricted advertisements in college papers and not in all campus 
media.381
The policies and studies discussed in Part I.D.2 indicate that although 
alcohol advertising influences demand for alcohol, limiting alcohol 
advertising is not the most efficient means of curtailing underage and 
excessive drinking on college campuses.
 
382  Alternative policies, such as 
dedicated campus enforcement efforts of drinking laws, increased taxation 
on alcohol, and multi-pronged education efforts have proven more effective 
at educating college students about the risks of underage and excessive 
drinking, and at encouraging changes in these drinking patterns.383
CONCLUSION 
  Given 
the availability of alternatives, despite the Virginia restriction’s “narrow” 
application, the Fourth Circuit should not have determined that the fourth 
prong of Central Hudson was met. 
Colleges and universities face a grave problem with underage and 
excessive drinking on their campuses.  While alcohol advertising may 
generally influence demand, this does not justify unconstitutional 
restrictions on commercial speech.  States interested in curtailing underage 
and binge drinking should focus their regulatory efforts on enforcing 
alcohol beverage laws and educating students about the dangers of drinking, 
rather than adopting paternalistic approaches to the problem like the 
challenged Virginia statute at issue in Educational Media Co.  Given the 
importance of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court should take the  
next opportunity to reaffirm the constitutional protections afforded to vice 
advertising. 
 
 
 378. See supra notes 314–17, 326–27 and accompanying text (noting Judge Moon’s 
disagreement with the majority’s fourth prong application). 
 379. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra notes 263–71 and accompanying text (discussing more effective policies 
for reducing underage and excessive drinking on college campuses). 
 381. See supra Part I (detailing how the fourth prong has consistently required that the 
government show why a challenged restriction is necessary to achieve its stated interest). 
 382. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 383. See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text (detailing the district court’s 
application of the fourth Central Hudson prong in Educational Media Co.). 
